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Abstract
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group
of voters decide to vote in a way that does not represent their true preferences in order to
improve the outcome of the election. The present paper is devoted to study coalitional
manipulability within the class of scoring voting rules. For any such rule and any num-
ber of alternatives, we introduce a new approach allowing us to characterize the list of
inequalities which are satisfied by a preference profile if and only if it is manipulable by
a coalition of voters. Furthermore, the probability of manipulable outcomes for some
well-studied scoring voting rules in case of small number of alternatives and large elec-
torates are presented under a well-known assumption on individual preference profiles.
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1 Introduction
Since the papers of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) who proved that every non-
dictatorial social choice rule, that is a procedure used by a group of individuals/voters for
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making a choice from the set of alternatives, can be manipulated in the presence of three
or more alternatives, the problem of coalitional manipulation has attracted a lot of attention
during the last decades in social choice theory. Broadly speaking, a given social choice rule
is called coalitionally manipulable if there exists a given list of voting preferences each of
them associated with a specific voter in the society and a coalition of voters, that is a non-
empty subset of voters, such that the preferences of all the voters outside the coalition remain
the same, while the preferences of voters within the coalition can be altered in such a way
that the winner changes and each of the voters from the coalition is ‘happy about the change’.
A number of studies has been conducted on the evaluation of the degree of manipulabil-
ity of various social choice rules, i.e., the extent to which social choice rules are manipula-
ble. Scoring voting rules, also called positional voting rules, have attracted a considerable
amount of attention in this literature such as Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999), Chamberlin
(1985),Diss (2015),El Ouafdi et al. (2020a),El Ouafdi et al. (2020b),Favardin and Lepelley
(2006), Favardin et al. (2002), Gehrlein et al. (2013), Kamwa and Moyouwou (2020), Kelly
(1993),Kim and Roush (1996),Lepelley and Mbih (1994),Lepelley et al. (2008),Moyouwou
and Tchantcho (2017), Nitzan (1985), Peleg (1979), Pritchard and Wilson (2007a), Pritchard
and Wilson (2007b), Saari (1990), and Schürmann (2013). This class of voting rules can be
defined as follows: each voter’s preference must be a vector that gives the number of points
that the voter assigns to each alternative according to his or her position in the voter’s prefer-
ence. The vote vectors of all voters are summed and the winning alternative has the highest
number of points. The methodology used in this literature consists first in characterizing
the specific conditions that must be required for a given voting rule to be manipulable by a
coalition of voters. The final step consists in the evaluation of the (theoretical) probability
of this situation under various assumptions on voters’ preferences. For more details on those
probabilistic assumptions and their use in social choice theory, the reader can refer to Diss
and Merlin (2020), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2017), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011).
However, as pointed out in a recent paper by El Ouafdi et al. (2020a), with some notable
exceptions the results appearing in the literature only deal with three-alternative elections,
not because it is the most interesting case but due to the difficulties arising when considering
more than three alternatives. The main goal of this paper is to provide a significant improve-
ment in this direction. This is achieved via presenting systems of linear inequalities, which
determine manipulable profiles, that is the lists defining the vote of all voters taking part in
the decision process, for the whole class of scoring voting rules independently on the number
of alternatives. More precisely, we focus on a detailed exposition of the new approach for
obtaining the list of linear inequalities a profile satisfies if and only if it is manipulable in
case ofm ≥ 3 alternatives for all scoring rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework. The core
of the paper is Section 3, where the main results are presented. We start of with providing a
simplified illustration of how our methodology works in case of three-alternative elections.
Then, the precise list of inequalities for the whole class of scoring rules is presented. At-
tention will be focused on the limiting case where the number of voters tends to infinity, but
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we further present the case of any number of voters as a corollary of our main result. This
will enable us to complete the existing literature dealing with the probability of manipula-
ble outcomes by providing in Section 4 the corresponding values for the three most studied
scoring rules in this literature which are Plurality, Antiplurality and Borda rules in the pres-
ence of m = 4 and m = 5 alternatives under the well-known Impartial and Anonymous
Culture assumption (defined later). The results are approximate since they are obtained by
Monte-Carlo simulations, but with a high degree of precision, since we used profiles of car-
dinality 8 · 106 for m = 4 and 8 · 105 for m = 5 alternatives. To the best of our knowledge
none of those results with the exception of the degree of manipulability of the Plurality rule
for m = 4 (see El Ouafdi et al. (2020a)) have appeared in the literature. The new results
clearly indicate that among the three positional rules under consideration Antiplurality has a
much lesser degree of manipulability (see Tables 5, 6, and 7). The last section presents our
conclusions.
2 Preliminary definitions
The number of voters/individuals is denoted by n and the number of alternatives/candidates
bym. The voters’ preferences are assumed to be linear orders which means that voters rank
alternatives from most preferred to least preferred and indifference is not allowed. An anony-
mous preference profile, hereafter simply called a profile, is an m!-tuple of non-negative in-
teger numbers (n1, n2, . . . , nm!) such that ni ≥ 0 for all m! ≥ i ≥ 1 and
m!∑
i=1
ni = n.1 Each
ni is equal to the number of voters with preferences of type i. In the limit as n → ∞, we
consider the normalized profile vectors of the form p = (p1, . . . , pm!) with each pi ≥ 0 and
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1. Throughout the paper the preferences are always listed following the numerical
values of the alternatives which will be calledA1,A2, . . . ,Am. The proportion of individuals
having each possible preference ranking will be denoted accordingly. For instance, in case of
m = 3 alternatives, we note (A1, A2, A3) p1, (A1, A3, A2) p2, (A2, A1, A3) p3, (A2, A3, A1)
p4, (A3, A1, A2) p5 and (A3, A2, A1) p6. The notation (A1, A2, A3) p1, for instance, means
that a fraction p1 of individuals have preferences with A1 being most preferred, A3 being
least preferred and with A2 being ranked between them.
In the case of m alternatives and individual preferences expressed as linear orders, we
can define the class of scoring voting rules as follows:
Definition 2.1. In the case of linear orders on m alternatives, every scoring voting rule can
be defined by the weight vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wm) such that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wm
and w1 > wm. It means that each time an alternative is ranked r-th by one voter it obtains
wr points; afterwards we select the alternative(s) realizing the greatest aggregated score.
1This is also known as a voting situation in the literature.
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Given this definition, we are now ready to describe three well-known scoring voting
rules. Under Plurality rule each voter has one vote which he/she can cast for any one of
the m alternatives, i.e., w = (1, 0, . . . , 0), and we select the alternative with the highest
aggregated score. Under Borda rule, we select the alternative with the highest Borda score
such that each first-place vote is worthm− 1 points, each second-place vote is worthm− 2
points, and so on until 0 point to each last-place vote, i.e., w = (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 1, 0).
Under Antiplurality rule, we return the alternative with the highest aggregated score such
that each voter assigns one point for any one of the m − 1 best ranked alternatives, i.e.,
w = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
Note that in the presence of three alternatives A1, A2, and A3, we see that any general
scoring rule w = (w1, w2, w3) is equivalent to the scoring vector (1, λ, 0) with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
This is obtained by subtractingw3 and dividing byw1−w3 any component ofw. The well-
known scoring rules become the Plurality rule with λ = 0, the Borda rule with λ = 0.5, and
the Antiplurality rule with λ = 1.
As already mentioned we focus in this paper on the coalitional manipulation which can
be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. The outcome of an election is said to be coalitionally manipulable if there
exists an alternative such that all members of the electorate for whom she is preferable over
the winning alternative can change their preferences in such a way that this alternative wins
the election. The preferences of the rest of the electorate remain the same.
We mainly focus in this paper on the manipulation by coalitions of maximal sizes but
we will also show that the approach that we consider can be adapted when manipulation by
coalitions of smaller sizes of the electorate is considered.
We say that the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am) if the collective ranking of the
alternatives before manipulation is: A1 first, A2 second and so on until alternative Am which
is ranked last. Let us consider an example in order to highlight the notion of manipulation.
Example 2.3. Let m = 3 and the scoring rule be Borda rule, i.e., w = (2, 1, 0). To show a
manipulable outcome, we set p1 = 5/9, p3 = 4/9, and pj = 0 for j 6= 1, 3. By the definition
of Borda rule, the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, A3) since alternativeA1 wins and gets 14/9
points, A2 gets 13/9 points, and finallyA3 gets 0 points. But, if voters having the preference
(A2, A3, A1) chose to vote (A2, A1, A3) instead, then the final result would be in favor of
alternative A2 since A1 gets 10/9 points, A2 gets 13/9 points, and A3 gets 4/9 points.
With a given initial arrangement, m − 1 different coalitions can be formed. This is due
to the fact that for each alternative, who has not won the election, there may be a group of
voters who rank it higher than the winner. As any coalition is determined by the alternative it
would prefer to have as the winner of the election, the alternatives’ names will be used for the
notations of the coalitions hereafter. Alternative Ai will be called unifying for the coalition
denoted by CoalAi that would prefer to have Ai as the winner and let us denote by CAi the
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proportion of individuals in this coalition. In the case of m = 3 alternatives, for instance,
two coalitions can be formed since the unifying alternative can be any alternative except the
winner. In this case, when the winner is alternative A1, we have that alternative A2 is unify-
ing for the coalition CoalA2 formed by voters with preferences (A2, A1, A3), (A2, A3, A1)
and (A3, A2, A1) and alternative A3 is unifying for the coalition CoalA3 formed by voters
with preferences (A3, A1, A2), (A3, A2, A1) and (A2, A3, A1). It is clear that the preferences
(A2, A3, A1) and (A3, A2, A1) participate in both coalitions CoalA2 and CoalA3 .
We introduce now the concept of intermediate preferences.
Definition 2.4. Intermediate preferences are preferences of the form (∗, ∗, . . . , ∗) with each
"∗" symbol being either an alternative’s name or the "?" mark, the latter representing the fact
that its corresponding rank has yet to be assigned by the voter.
Typical examples of intermediate preferences in three-alternative elections are (?, ?, ?)
where the concerned voter is undecided on all of the three positions and (A1, ?, ?) where
the concerned voter ranks alternative A1 at the first position and he/she is undecided on the
second and third positions in his/her preference.
Let us now introduce the number d(Ak, Ai), with i 6= k, which denotes the differ-
ence in points between the unifying alternative Ak and alternative Ai prior to the coalition
participants’ arrangement of all the places except the first. In the case of three alterna-
tives, when the winner is alternative A1 for instance, individuals of CoalA2 (of proportion
CA2 = p3+p4+p6) vote for alternative A2, i.e., the unifying alternative of that coalition. In
addition, those individuals only assign weight 1 to their first preferred alternative and zero
weight to the other alternatives prior to the coalition participants’ arrangement of the second
and third places. In other words, those individuals have an intermediate preference of type
(A2, ?, ?). Note that the other individuals (of proportion p1 + p2 + p5) assign all their points
and vote sincerely when we focus on the manipulation in favor of A2. As a consequence, the
score of alternativeA2 is λp1+p3+p4+p6 and the score of alternativeA1 is p1+p2+λp5.
This leads to d(A2, A1) = p3 + p4 + p6 − p2 + (λ− 1)p1 − p5.
3 Conditions describing manipulability
In this section we show that for every coalition there exists a system of inequalities which
characterize the set of all the profiles that are manipulable by it. In order to make a simplified
illustration of the general case that we will provide in Theorem 3.1, let us start first by the
case of three-alternative elections. Let again the alternatives be referred to as A1, A2, and
A3 and consider the representation w = (1, λ, 0), with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, that defines all possible
scoring rules with three alternatives. Using all the above definitions, we are ready to provide
the list of inequalities which characterizes the set of all the profiles p = (p1, . . . , p6) that
are manipulable by a coalition of voters for three alternatives. The first system indicates
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conditions where manipulation is in favour of A2 whereas the second system is given for a
manipulation in favour of A3.
pi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 = 1
(1− λ)p1 + p2 + (λ− 1)p3 − p4 + λp5 − λp6 > 0, A1 beats A2
λp1 − λp2 + p3 + (1− λ)p4 − p5 + (λ− 1)p6 > 0, A2 beats A3
p3 + p4 + p6 − p2 + (λ− 1)p1 − λp5 > 0, d(A2, A1) > 0
(2− λ)(p3 + p4 + p6) + (2λ− 1)p1 − (1+ λ)p2 − (1+ λ)p5 > 0, d(A2, A1) + d(A2, A3) > λCA2
pi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 = 1
(1− λ)p1 + p2 + (λ− 1)p3 − p4 + λp5 − λp6 > 0, A1 beats A2
λp1 − λp2 + p3 + (1− λ)p4 − p5 + (λ− 1)p6 > 0, A2 beats A3
p4 + p5 + p6 − p1 + (λ− 1)p2 − λp3 > 0, d(A3, A1) > 0
p4 + p5 + p6 − p3 + λp2 − λp1 > 0, d(A3, A2) > 0
(2− λ)(p4 + p5 + p6) − (1+ λ)p1 + (2λ− 1)p2 − (1+ λ)p3 > 0, d(A3, A1) + d(A3, A2) > λCA3 .
(3.1)
Without loss of generality we assume that the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, A3). This
means that A1 has more total points than A2 who in turn has more total points than A3. This
explains the two first inequalities of every system. Recall that when the winner is alternative
A1 we have that alternative A2 is unifying for the coalition CoalA2 formed by voters with
preferences (A2, A1, A3),(A2, A3, A1), and (A3, A2, A1). If we count the number of points
for each alternative prior to the coalition participants’ arrangement of all the places except
the first which is given to the unifying alternative Ak (i.e., having intermediate preferences
of the form (Ak, ?, ?)), the unifying alternative Ak must have the largest number of points.
Thus, the two inequalities d(Ak, Ai) > 0, i 6= k are necessary with k = 2 and k =
3 for the first and the second systems, respectively. Note that the inequality called ‘A2
beats A3’ in the first system leads to d(A2, A3) > 0. The next step is to understand when
individuals of the coalition unified by an alternative can successfully manipulate the election.
Actually, all the freedom they possess at this point is to give λ points from each participant
of the coalition (by assigning the second place) to one of the remaining two alternatives
without violating the condition that their alternative has more points. This can be done if
and only if the sum of the differences in points between the unifying alternative and each
of the remaining two, prior to the coalition members’ making a choice of their second most
preferable alternative, is greater than λ times the number of people in the coalition. This
is equivalent to d(A2, A1) + d(A2, A3) > λCA2 and d(A3, A1) + d(A3, A2) > λCA3 in
the first and the second systems, respectively. Recalling that we consider a manipulation by
coalitions of maximal sizes (i.e., CA2 = p3 + p4 + p6 and CA3 = p4 + p5 + p6), this leads
to the last inequality of every system. That analysis gives first insights on the validity of our
approach since the systems described above are exactly the same as the ones already obtained
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by Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2017) who determined necessary and sufficient conditions
for a given profile to be coalitionally manipulable under a general scoring rule with three
alternatives.
We consider now the general case of m alternatives. Recall that the unifying alternative
can be any alternative except the winner so thatm− 1 coalitions can be formed. Here again
we consider the coalitions of maximal sizes, i.e., each coalition consists of all voters with
the unifying alternative ranked higher than the winner in their preferences. The set of such
preferences has cardinality m!
2
.
Theorem 3.1. Let m ≥ 3 and suppose that the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am)
under the positional voting rule having weight vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wm). A profile
p = (p1, . . . , pm!) is manipulable by the coalition with unifying alternative Ak if and only if
p satisfies the following system of inequalities:
Preliminary Inequalities (PI)
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1
pi ≥ 0
The initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am)
Strategic Inequalities (SI)
∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) > (w2 + . . .+wm−1 +wm)CAk∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −M1 > (w3 + . . .+wm−1 +wm)CAk
. . .∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−4∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−2 +wm−1 +wm)CAk∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−3∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−1 +wm)CAk
Mm−1 > wmCAk ,
(3.2)
where M1 = max{d(Ak, Ai) | i 6= k},M2 = max2{d(Ak, Ai) | i 6= k}, . . . ,Mm−1 =
maxm−1{d(Ak, Ai) | i 6= k}. The notation maxi{d(Ak, Ai) | i 6= k} stands for the ith largest
value in {d(Ak, Ai) | i 6= k}.
Proof. First let us show that the SI inequalities in (3.2) are necessary. This will be checked
by induction on m, the base being m = 3. Notice that it is clearly reasonable for all the
members of the coalition to start filling their profiles by updating their intermediate prefer-
ences to (Ak, ?, . . . , ?). The first inequality in the SI system simply guarantees that after that
update the coalition participants can distribute the remaining votes they have to give without
violating the fact that Ak has more points than any other alternatives with no restrictions on
the distribution of the votes. The second to last inequalities of the SI system can be seen to
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be those for the positional rule with w ′ = (w1, w3, . . . , wm−1, wm) and m − 1 alternatives
(alternative As withM1 = d(Ak, As) is eliminated). The statement follows.
Now we establish the sufficiency of inequalities (3.2). We argue by induction on the number
of alternatives m, the base being m = 3. The sufficiency of inequalities (3.2) is estab-
lished via the step by step procedure of updating the intermediate preferences of coalition
participants presented below.
Step 1. All the members of the coalition start filling their preferences by puttingAk as the most
preferrable alternative. At this point the preferences of all participants of CoalAk are
identical and equal to (Ak, ?, . . . , ?), where the question marks stand for the places yet
to be assigned.
Step 2. Let As be the alternative with d(Ak, As) = M1. We will distinguish between two
cases:
case (a) M1 > w2CAk . Then all participants of CoalAk update their intermediate pref-
erences to (Ak, As, ?, . . . , ?) and the list of inequalities in the SI system of (3.2)
without the second one from the top is easily seen to be the one for the positional
rule withm− 1 alternatives and weight vector (w1, w3, . . . , wm);
case (b) wσCAk < M1 < wσ−1CAk for some 2 < σ ≤ m. We would like to point out
that the case M1 < wmCAk can never occur as it would imply
∑
i 6=k
d(Ak, Ai) <
(m−1)wmCAk < (w2+. . .+wm−1+wm)CAk and violate the first (SI) inequality.
Let ε > 0 be an arbitrary small positive constant, satisfying
(?) ε does not exceed the smallest difference between the left-hand side and
right-hand side of the SI inequalities of (3.2).
It will serve as the remaining difference in points between Ak and As after the
update of preferences described below. Set t := M1−wσCAk
wσ−1−wσ
− ε and let t ‘par-
ticipants’ update their intermediate preferences to (Ak, ?, . . . , ?, As
σ−1
, ?, . . . , ?) and
the remaining CAk − t to (Ak, ?, . . . , ?, As
σ
, ?, . . . , ?). Introduce the weight
wσ−1,σ :=
(CAk − t)wσ−1 + twσ
CAk
(3.3)
and set
w ′ = (w1, . . . , wσ−2, wσ−1,σ, wσ+1, . . . , wm). (3.4)
After updates of coalition participants’ intermediate preferences and elimination
of alternative As, the system of SI inequalities in (3.2) becomes the one for the
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positional rule withm− 1 alternatives and weight vector w ′:
∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) > (w2 + . . .+wσ−1,σ + . . .+wm)CAk∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) −M2 > (w3 + . . .+wσ−1,σ + . . .+wm)CAk
. . .∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) −
σ−2∑
j=2
Mj > (wσ−1,σ + . . .+wm)CAk∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) −
σ−1∑
j=2
Mj > (wσ+1 + . . .+wm)CAk
. . .∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−4∑
j=2
Mj > (wm−2 +wm−1 +wm)CAk∑
i 6=k,s
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−3∑
j=2
Mj > (wm−1 +wm)CAk
Mm−1 > wmCAk ,
(3.5)
which, using thatM1 = d(Ak, As) = (wσ−1+wσ−wσ−1,σ)CAk , can be rewritten
as

∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) > (w2 + . . .+wσ−1 +wσ + . . .+wm)CAk + ε∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −M2 > (w3 + . . .+wσ−1 +wσ + . . .+wm)CAk + ε
. . .∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
σ−2∑
j=2
Mj > (wσ−1 +wσ + . . .+wm)CAk + ε∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
σ−1∑
j=2
Mj > (wσ+1 + . . .+wm)CAk
. . .∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−4∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−2 +wm−1 +wm)CAk∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−3∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−1 +wm)CAk
Mm−1 > wmCAk
(3.6)
Recalling that M1 is greater than any other Mi by definition and using the (?)
assumption on ε, we see that each of the inequalities in (3.6) follows from the
corresponding SI inequality in (3.2).
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Let us now illustrate the results of this theorem using an example.
Example 3.2. Consider the Borda rule with weight vector w = (3, 2, 1, 0) for m = 4
alternativesA1,A2,A3, andA4 and the voting profile given in Table 1 below. In this example,
the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, A3, A4) as it is shown in the last row. We would like
to determine if the chosen profile is vulnerable to manipulability by the largest possible
coalition with unifying alternativeA2, i.e., CoalA2 of cardinality CA2 = p7+p8+p15 = 5/9.
Table 1: Voting profile and corresponding point distribution
Preference Fraction A1 A2 A3 A4
(A2, A1, A3, A4) p7 = 2/9 4/9 6/9 2/9 0
(A2, A1, A4, A3) p8 = 2/9 4/9 6/9 0 2/9
(A3, A1, A4, A2) p14 = 1/9 2/9 0 3/9 1/9
(A3, A2, A1, A4) p15 = 1/9 1/9 2/9 3/9 0
(A3, A4, A1, A2) p17 = 1/9 1/9 0 3/9 2/9
(A4, A1, A3, A2) p20 = 2/9 4/9 0 2/9 6/9
Other pi = 0 0 0 0 0∑
1 16/9 14/9 13/9 11/9
In order to answer this question we will adhere to the step by step procedure given in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 above. The intermediate preferences of the participants in the coalition
after the first update are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Step 1 intermediate preferences and corresponding point distribution
Preference Fraction A1 A2 A3 A4
(A2, ?, ?, ?) CA2 = 5/9 0 15/9 0 0
(A3, A1, A4, A2) p14 = 1/9 2/9 0 3/9 1/9
(A3, A4, A1, A2) p17 = 1/9 1/9 0 3/9 2/9
(A4, A1, A3, A2) p20 = 2/9 4/9 0 2/9 6/9
Other pi = 0 0 0 0 0∑
1 7/9 15/9 8/9 1
This allows to evaluate d(A2, Ai) for every i 6= 2:
d(A2, A1) = 15/9− 7/9 = 8/9
d(A2, A3) = 15/9− 8/9 = 7/9
d(A2, A4) = 15/9− 1 = 6/9
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From here we deduce that M1 = max{d(A2, Ai) | i 6= k} = d(A2, A1) = 8/9 and since
w3CA2 = 5/9 < 8/9 < 10/9 = w2CA2 , we are in case (b) of Step (2) above. The next step
is to compute
t =
8/9− 1 · 5/9
2− 1
− ε = 3/9− ε
and update the intermediate profiles accordingly (see Table 3). At this point we have reduced
the problem to the case of three alternatives (A2, A3, and A4) and positional rule determined
by the weight vector (3,w2,3, 0), where
w2,3 =
(2/9+ ε) · 1+ (3/9− ε) · 2
5/9
= 8/5− 9ε/5 = 1.6− 9ε/5.
Table 3: Step 2 intermediate preferences and corresponding point distribution
Preference Fraction A1 A2 A3 A4
(A2, A1, ?, ?) t = 3/9− ε 6/9− 2ε 1− 3ε 0 0
(A2, ?, A1, ?) 2/9+ ε 2/9+ ε 6/9+ 3ε 0 0
(A3, A1, A4, A2) p14 = 1/9 2/9 0 3/9 1/9
(A3, A4, A1, A2) p17 = 1/9 1/9 0 3/9 2/9
(A4, A1, A3, A2) p20 = 2/9 4/9 0 2/9 6/9
Other pi = 0 0 0 0 0∑
1 15/9− ε 15/9 8/9 1
At this stage the question of manipulability is resolved according to whether or not the
inequality
d(A2, A3) + d(A2, A4) > w2,3CA2
is satisfied. Plugging in the corresponding values we obtain
7/9+ 6/9 = 13/9 > 8/9− ε = 5/9(1.6− 9ε/5),
securing the affirmative answer.
One possible arrangement of the complete profiles is presented in Table 4 and this con-
cludes our example.
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Table 4: Complete strategic profile and resulting point distribution
Preference Fraction A1 A2 A3 A4
(A2, A1, A3, A4) (3/9− ε) · 3/5 18/45− 6ε/5 27/45− 9ε/5 9/45− 3ε/5 0
(A2, A3, A1, A4) (2/9+ ε) · 3/5 6/45+ 3ε/5 18/45+ 9ε/5 12/45+ 6ε/5 0
(A2, A1, A4, A3) (3/9− ε) · 2/5 12/45− 4ε/5 18/45− 6ε/5 0 6/45− 2ε/5
(A2, A4, A1, A3) (2/9+ ε) · 2/5 4/45+ 2ε/5 12/45+ 6ε/5 0 8/45+ 4ε/5
(A3, A1, A4, A2) p14 = 1/9 2/9 0 3/9 1/9
(A3, A4, A1, A2) p17 = 1/9 1/9 0 3/9 2/9
(A4, A1, A3, A2) p20 = 2/9 4/9 0 2/9 6/9
Else pi = 0 0 0 0 0∑
1 75/45− ε 75/45 61/45+ 3ε/5 59/45+ 2ε/5
Since w2 = w3 = . . . = wm = 0 under the Plurality rule, the SI inequalities reduce to
d(Ak, Ai) > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m | i 6= k}. Then the following corollary can be deduced from
Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 3.3. Consider the Plurality voting rule with m ≥ 3 alternatives. A profile p =
(p1, . . . , pm!) is manipulable by a coalition with unifying alternative Ak if and only if p
satisfies the following system of inequalities:
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1
pi ≥ 0
The initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am)
d(Ak, Ai) > 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m | i 6= k} (SI).
(3.7)
We would like to bring the reader’s attention to the fact that the SI inequalities in (3.7)
are the same as inequalities (2) in Theorem 1 of Lepelley and Mbih (1987), where the char-
acterization of coalitional manipulable profiles under Plurality rule was first derived. We
also bring the reader’s attention to the fact that Lepelley and Valognes (2003) and Favardin
et al. (2002) deal with the coalitional manipulation of the Antiplurality rule (λ = 1) and
the Borda rule (λ = 2), respectively, in the case of three-alternative elections. The approach
that we use in this paper to derive our list of inequalities is different from those used by the
authors below. This explains why the systems given in these papers (Lemma 2 in Lepelley
and Valognes (2003) and Lemma 4 in Favardin et al. (2002)) are not a direct consequence
of the systems given in Theorem 3.1. However, our results in Section 4 for the case of three
alternatives allow us to show that the two characterizations are equivalent.
The next remark concerns the case where the number of voters is small.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.1 holds true in case of finite number of voters provided the weight
vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wm) is such that all the differences wi −wi+1 satisfy
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(??) wi −wi+1 ∈ {0, s} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and some fixed number s > 0.
Under the assumption (??) the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1 works essentially with-
out changes. The only place, where condition (??) comes into play is case (b) of Step 2,
where it allows the appropriate choice of t for using the difference M1 = d(Ak, As) to the
fullest. Notice that the weights of Plurality, Antiplurality, and Borda rules satisfy ?? with
s = 1.
We show that without the assumption (??) on weights the statement of Remark 3.4 may
not hold true.
Example 3.5. Consider the case of m = 3 alternatives A1, A2 and A3 and the scoring
rule with weight vector w = (1, 0.9, 0). Let there be n = 21 voters and the profile p =
(6, 7, 8, 0, 0, 0). Then initiallyA1 gets 20.2 points,A2 gets 13.4 points andA3 gets 6.3 points
satisfying the arrangement assumptions. Next we show that the remaining two inequalities
in the system, responsible for the possibility of manipulation by CoalA2 , hold true for the
profile p as well. Indeed, d(A2, A1) = 0.4 > 0 and d(A2, A1) + d(A2, A3) = 7.5 > 7.2 =
λCA2 . However, if a single member of the coalition updated his/her profile to (A2, A1, A3)
then λ = 0.9 > 0.4 = d(A2, A1) would lead to alternative A1 getting ahead of A2. On the
other hand it is not possible for all 8 people inCoalA2 to update their profiles to (A2, A3, A1)
either, as d(A2, A3) = 7.1 < 7.2 = λCA2 . Hence, the profile is not manipulable by CoalA2 .
As already noticed, the approach that we consider in the main result of the paper can
be adapted when only manipulation by small coalitions is considered. Indeed, under some
profiles a small coalition may reverse the relative ranking of two alternatives as it is shown
in the following example.
Example 3.6. Let m = 3 and the scoring rule be Borda rule having w = (2, 1, 0). As in
Example 2.3, we set p1 = 5/9, p3 = 4/9, and pj = 0 for j 6= 1, 3. The initial arrangement
is (A1, A2, A3) since alternative A1 wins and gets 14/9 points, A2 gets 13/9 points, and
finally A3 gets 0 points. But, if a fraction p = 2/9 of voters chose (A2, A3, A1) instead of
(A2, A1, A3), and the others kept their preferences unchanged, then the final result would be
in favor of alternative A2 since A1 gets 12/9 points, A2 gets 13/9 points, and A3 gets 2/9
points. In other words, a manipulation in favor of A2 is also possible with a coalition of
voters smaller than the maximal size (see Example 2.3 for a manipulation by a coalition of a
maximal size).
Corollary 3.7. Let m ≥ 3 and suppose that the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am)
under the positional voting rule having weight vector w = (w1, w2, . . . , wm). A profile
p = (p1, . . . , pm!) is manipulable by some coalition not exceeding a proportion 0 < p ≤ 1
of the electorate with unifying alternative Ak if and only if p satisfies the following system of
inequalities:
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
Preliminary Inequalities (PI)
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1
pi ≥ 0
0 ≤ p˜j ≤ pj for j, s.t. A1 ≺j Ak∑
A1≺jAk
p˜j = p
The initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am)
Strategic Inequalities (SI)
∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) > (w2 + . . .+wm−1 +wm)p∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −M1 > (w3 + . . .+wm−1 +wm)p
. . .∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−4∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−2 +wm−1 +wm)p∑
i6=k
d(Ak, Ai) −
m−3∑
j=1
Mj > (wm−1 +wm)p
Mm−1 > wmp,
(3.8)
where by A1 ≺j Ak we understand that Ak has a higher ranking than A1 in preference of
type j and p˜j denotes the share of ‘participants’ with preference of this type. The added
PI inequalities correspond to the fact that each p˜j can not exceed pj. As it is sufficient to
consider coalitions of the largest allowed proportion, we add the equality
∑
A1≺jAk
p˜j = p.
We finish this part with a remark on the manipulability of the Antiplurality rule.
Remark 3.8. Suppose that the initial arrangement is (A1, A2, . . . , Am). The group of vot-
ers having the last alternative prior in their preferences (CoalAm) can never manipulate an
election under Antiplurality rule whichever the number of alternatives m is. Otherwise, as
after such a manipulation the last alternative Am would have the same number of points (his
number of points is not influenced by the manipulation) all the other alternatives would have
to undergo a simultaneous loss of points. That is clearly impossible, because the number of
rearranged points equals to the number of points initially arranged between the alternatives
A1, . . . , Am−1.
4 Some numerical results
The aim of this section is to compute the share of manipulable profiles for three well-studied
scoring rules under the assumption of Impartial and Anonymous Culture (IAC) in the limit
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case as n → ∞. We consider this hypothesis because it has been widely used in many
papers that we cite in the introduction. When n → ∞, this assumption indicates that all
profile vectors of the form p = (p1, . . . , pm!), with each pi ≥ 0 and
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1, are equally
likely to occur. This probability distribution was first introduced by Fishburn and Gehrlein
(1976). For more details on the IAC condition and others, we refer the reader to Diss and
Merlin (2020), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2017).
It is well-known that the limiting probability of every voting event (here the manipulation
of voting outcomes) under IAC can be simply reduced to volume computations. Since the
normalized profile vectors are of the form p = (p1, . . . , pm!)with each pi ≥ 0 and
m!∑
i=1
pi = 1,
the polytope that describes all possible profile vectors defines the standard simplex4 ⊂ Rm!.
The volume of 4 ⊂ Rd is equal to 1
(d−1)!
, which, since in our case d = m!, becomes
1
m!−1
. What remains to compute is the volumes of the polytopes PAk (with k = 1, . . . ,m)
cutting out the regions of profiles manipulable byCoalAk inside the standard simplex4. For
instance, in the case of three alternatives, the volumes of the polytopes PA2 and PA3 cutting
out the regions of profiles manipulable by CoalA2 and CoalA3 (see systems in (3.1)) inside
the standard simplex 4 are required. Then the total volume of the region of manipulable
profiles is given by Vol(PA2)+Vol(PA3)−Vol(PA2∩PA3). Afterwards the result is divided
by the volume of the standard simplex and multiplied by 6 (all possible final arrangements of
alternatives) to produce the final answer. The approach described in Cervone et al. (2005)2
tells us an effective way to tackle this problem for three-alternative elections. When we have
more than three alternatives, however, those methods become too complicated in practice.
Indeed, due to dimension reasons, the precise probabilities seem to be difficult to obtain for
m = 4 and it is impossible to compute form ≥ 5 at this stage using the existing algorithms.
In case the precise volume cannot be found, it is natural to obtain a sufficiently good ap-
proximation of it. One of the most commonly used procedures for this purpose is the Monte
Carlo volume estimation. The share of manipulable outcomes for Plurality, Antiplurality and
Borda rule in case of m = 3, 4, 5 alternatives are presented in Table 5 (exact results), and
Tables 6 and 7 (simulated results).
Table 5: Share of manipulable outcomes withm = 3 alternatives
Rule Manipulable by CoalA2 by CoalA3
Plurality 29.17% 24.65% 15.63%
Antiplurality 51.85% 51.85% 0%
Borda 50.25% 47.71% 9.71%
2See also Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2017).
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Table 6: Share of manipulable outcomes withm = 4 alternatives
Rule Manipulable by CoalA2 by CoalA3 by CoalA4
Plurality 87.38% 83.65% 73.87% 63.53%
Antiplurality 87.13% 86.47% 22.83% 0%
Borda 95.65% 95.03% 79.16% 43.38%
Table 7: Share of manipulable outcomes withm = 5 alternatives
Rule Manipulable by CoalA2 by CoalA3 by CoalA4 by CoalA5
Plurality 99.51% 99.37% 99.05% 98.57% 98.04%
Antiplurality 97.15% 96.79% 54.78% 6.52% 0%
Borda 99.76% 99.23% 98.95% 98.18% 97.83%
Our numerical results allow us to conclude that (i) moving from three to four and five
alternatives very significantly increases the vulnerability to coalitional manipulation under
all the scoring rules that we consider and (ii) the hierarchy of the scoring rules with respect
to the susceptibility to coalitional manipulability changes when the number of alternatives
increases: The Antiplurality rule seems to be the most performing when the number of al-
ternatives is four and five, whereas it is the most prone to manipulation in the case of three
alternatives.
Recall that Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2017) determined necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a given profile to be coalitionally manipulable under a general scoring rule with
three alternatives. The share of manipulable profiles has also been given in this paper under
the IAC condition. Our results for Table 5 coincide with their results which were already
obtained in the literature as in Lepelley and Mbih (1987), Lepelley and Mbih (1994), and
Pritchard and Wilson (2007a). The case m = 4 for the Plurality rule was studied in El
Ouafdi et al. (2020a). The precise value of 87.28% for general manipulability was obtained
(this corresponds to 87.38% appearing in the top left corner of Table 6). In other words,
our approximation differs by 0.1%. Note also that the zero value in the last column of the
Antiplurality rule is consistent with Remark 3.8.
Finally, the Python code for carrying out the computation of the share of manipulable
outcomes in case of Borda rule with m = 4 alternatives is provided in Appendix A. A
detailed outline on the execution complimentary to the comments inside the code is given.
The recipe for finding the corresponding results for other scoring voting rules with than
m ≥ 4 alternatives is provided.
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5 Conclusion
At least three main extensions can emerge from the present study. First, it would be in-
teresting to investigate other voting rules not yet considered, especially in the class of the
so-called iterative scoring rules, also known as multi-stage or sequential elimination scoring
rules. This class of multi-round procedures are based on the same scoring principle previ-
ously defined but proceed by eliminating one or more alternatives at each round, until there
is only one alternative left who is considered as the winner. Second, taking into account the
possibility of reactions of voters outside the coalition that manipulates the vote may also be
a good extension of this study. This appears to have a considerable impact on the manipu-
lability shares and on the induced hierarchy of voting rules when analyzing strategic voting
(see for instance Favardin and Lepelley (2006)). Third, our probabilistic investigations may
also be extended to the framework with (i) small number of voters and (ii) small sizes of
manipulating coalitions using both Remark 3.4 and Corollary 3.8, respectively.
Appendix A: Python code used for computations in case of Borda count
withm = 4 alternatives
In this section we present the code (written in Python) used for carrying out the algorithm
for finding the share of manipulable outcomes in case of Borda rule withm = 4 alternatives.
With a few modifications to the code provided one can perform analogous computations for
scoring voting rules with different weights.
Step 1. Create the array of possible preferences with the alternatives corresponding to numbers
0 to 3 arranged in increasing order. This array has 24 elements. Each element of the
preferences’ array is an array of its own with 4 elements (see lines 14−25 in the code).
preferences[0] = {[0], [1], [2], [3]},
preferences[1] = {[0], [1], [3], [2]},
. . .
preferences[23] = {[3], [2], [1], [0]}.
After this the point distribution array is created, i.e., the element (i, j) (here 0 ≤ i ≤ 23
and 0 ≤ j ≤ 3) is the number of points alternative j gets from preference i (lines
27− 37.)
Step 2. Now we are in position to store the inequalities responsible for the initial arrangement
of alternatives. As usual we assume that this arrangement is (0, 1, 2, 3) and the 3 PI
inequalities responsible for that are obtained (lines 3− 8 and 38− 41).
Step 3. Next generate a sample of n (‘trials’ in the code) random points in the simplex 4.
For this choose 24 random numbers on the closed interval [0; 1], arrange them in a
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nondecreasing order and take the subsequent differences. The points created this way
have a uniform distribution in the simplex4 (see Chapter V.2 in Devroye (1986)). The
corresponding lines of the code are 43− 54.
Step 4. The coalition arrays are established. These are 3 arrays of 24 elements, each element
equal to 1 or 0, depending on whether preference i belongs to the coalition or not (lines
55− 66).
Step 5. The difference arrays are generated (lines 67− 105).
Step 6. The remaining part of the code stores the SI inequalities (3.2) responsible for the profile
being manipulable by each of the coalitions separately (recall that inequalities (3.2) are
written in terms of the elements of difference arrays established on the previous step)
and then checks for all sample points to determine how many of them satisfy the initial
arrangement conditions and are manipulable by at least one coalition.
1 import random
2
3 InitArrangement = 3 * [0]
4
5 for i in range(0, 3):
6 InitArrangement[i] = []
7 for j in range(0, 24):
8 InitArrangement[i].append(0)
9 # generating array of profiles
10 preferences = []
11 for i in range(1, 25):
12 preferences.append(i)
13 counter = 0
14 for i in range(0, 4):
15 for j in range(0, 4):
16 for k in range(0, 4):
17 for l in range(0, 4):
18 if (i != j and i != k and i != l
19 and j != k and j != l and k != l):
20 preferences[counter] = []
21 preferences[counter].append(i)
22 preferences[counter].append(j)
23 preferences[counter].append(k)
24 preferences[counter].append(l)
25 counter += 1
26 # generating array of points distribution according to profiles
27 PointDistArr = []
28 for i in range(0, 4):
29 PointDistArr.append(i)
30 for i in range(0, 4):
31 PointDistArr[i] = []
32 for j in range(0, 24):
33 PointDistArr[i].append(0)
34 for i in range(0, 24):
35 for j in range(0, 4):
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36 s = preferences[i][j]
37 PointDistArr[s][i] = 3 - j
38 for j in range(0, 24): # Initial arrangement is A>B>C>D
39 InitArrangement[0][j] = PointDistArr[0][j] - PointDistArr[1][j]
40 InitArrangement[1][j] = PointDistArr[1][j] - PointDistArr[2][j]
41 InitArrangement[2][j] = PointDistArr[2][j] - PointDistArr[3][j]
42
43 trials = 8000000 # number of points in the sample
44 TrialPts = trials * [0]
45 S = 24 * [0]
46 # creating random sample of points in the simplex
47 for i in range(0, trials):
48 TrialPts[i] = []
49 for j in range(0, 23):
50 S[j] = random.uniform(0, 1)
51 S[23]=1
52 TrialPts[i] = sorted(S)
53 for k in range(1, 24):
54 TrialPts[i][24 - k] -= TrialPts[i][23 - k]
55 # initiating coalition members arrays (1 if the preference
56 # belongs to the coalition and 0 otherwise)
57 CoalB = 24 * [0]
58 CoalC = 24 * [0]
59 CoalD = 24 * [0]
60 for j in range(0, 24):
61 if PointDistArr[0][j] < PointDistArr[1][j]:
62 CoalB[j] = 1
63 if PointDistArr[0][j] < PointDistArr[2][j]:
64 CoalC[j] = 1
65 if PointDistArr[0][j] < PointDistArr[3][j]:
66 CoalD[j] = 1
67 dBA = 24 * [0]
68 dBC = 24 * [0]
69 dBD = 24 * [0]
70 dCA = 24 * [0]
71 dCB = 24 * [0]
72 dCD = 24 * [0]
73 dDA = 24 * [0]
74 dDB = 24 * [0]
75 dDC = 24 * [0]
76 # computing d(B,A), d(B,C) and d(B,D)
77 for j in range(0, 24):
78 if CoalB[j] == 1:
79 dBA[j] = 3
80 dBC[j] = 3
81 dBD[j] = 3
82 else:
83 dBA[j] = PointDistArr[1][j] - PointDistArr[0][j]
84 dBC[j] = PointDistArr[1][j] - PointDistArr[2][j]
85 dBD[j] = PointDistArr[1][j] - PointDistArr[3][j]
86 # computing d(C,A), d(C,B) and d(C,D)
87 for j in range(0, 24):
88 if CoalC[j] == 1:
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89 dCA[j] = 3
90 dCB[j] = 3
91 dCD[j] = 3
92 else:
93 dCA[j] = PointDistArr[2][j] - PointDistArr[0][j]
94 dCB[j] = PointDistArr[2][j] - PointDistArr[1][j]
95 dCD[j] = PointDistArr[2][j] - PointDistArr[3][j]
96 # computing d(D,A), d(D,B) and d(D,C)
97 for j in range(0, 24):
98 if CoalD[j] == 1:
99 dDA[j] = 3
100 dDB[j] = 3
101 dDC[j] = 3
102 else:
103 dDA[j] = PointDistArr[3][j] - PointDistArr[0][j]
104 dDB[j] = PointDistArr[3][j] - PointDistArr[1][j]
105 dDC[j] = PointDistArr[3][j] - PointDistArr[2][j]
106
107 counter = 0
108 B = 3*[0]
109 C = 3*[0]
110 D = 3*[0]
111 Sb = trials*[0]
112 Sc = trials*[0]
113 Sd = trials*[0]
114 BmanipCheck = False
115 CmanipCheck = False
116 DmanipCheck = False
117 CoalBsize = 0
118 CoalCsize = 0
119 CoalDsize = 0
120 for i in range(0, trials):
121 check = False
122 CoalBsize = 0
123 CoalCsize = 0
124 CoalDsize = 0
125 Sb[i] = []
126 Sc[i] = []
127 Sd[i] = []
128 for j in range(0, 3):
129 s = 0
130 check = True
131 for k in range(0, 24):
132 s += TrialPts[i][k] * InitArrangement[j][k]
133 if s < 0:
134 check = False
135 break
136 if check is True:
137 BmanipCheck = False
138 CmanipCheck = False
139 DmanipCheck = False
140 for j in range(0, 3):
141 B[j] = 0
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142 C[j] = 0
143 D[j] = 0
144 for k in range(0, 24):
145 CoalBsize += TrialPts[i][k] * CoalB[k]
146 CoalCsize += TrialPts[i][k] * CoalC[k]
147 CoalDsize += TrialPts[i][k] * CoalD[k]
148 B[0] += TrialPts[i][k] * dBA[k]
149 B[1] += TrialPts[i][k] * dBC[k]
150 B[2] += TrialPts[i][k] * dBD[k]
151 C[0] += TrialPts[i][k] * dCA[k]
152 C[1] += TrialPts[i][k] * dCB[k]
153 C[2] += TrialPts[i][k] * dCD[k]
154 D[0] += TrialPts[i][k] * dDA[k]
155 D[1] += TrialPts[i][k] * dDB[k]
156 D[2] += TrialPts[i][k] * dDC[k]
157 Sb[i] = sorted(B)
158 Sc[i] = sorted(C)
159 Sd[i] = sorted(D)
160
161 if (Sb[i][0] > 0) and (Sb[i][0] + Sb[i][1] > CoalBsize) and (Sb[i][0]
+ Sb[i][1] + Sb[i][2] > 3 * CoalBsize):
162 BmanipCheck = True
163 if (Sc[i][0] > 0) and (Sc[i][0] + Sc[i][1] > CoalCsize) and (Sc[i][0]
+ Sc[i][1] + Sc[i][2] > 3 * CoalCsize):
164 CmanipCheck = True
165 if (Sd[i][0] > 0) and (Sd[i][0] + Sd[i][1] > CoalDsize) and (Sd[i][0]
+ Sd[i][1] + Sd[i][2] > 3 * CoalDsize):
166 DmanipCheck = True
167
168 if check is True and (BmanipCheck is True or CmanipCheck is True or
DmanipCheck is True):
169 counter += 1
170 ans = 0.0
171 ans = float(24 * counter / 10000)
172 print(str(ans) + ’%’)
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